第139回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会開催のお知らせ(The 139th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar)

  • place その他
  • 社会・政治・経済・法律
第139回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会開催のお知らせ(The 139th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar)

「制度と組織の経済学」研究会はOEIO(Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations:東京大学社会科学研究所と大阪大学IPP研究会による研究会)の主催により、理論研究・実証研究を問わず、ミクロ経済理論、マクロ経済理論、経済史などをテーマに研究しています。皆さまのご参加をお待ちしております。 Presenter: Junichiro Ishida, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Title: "Signaling under double-crossing preferences" Abstract: This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where he indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi-concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction.

カテゴリ 社会・政治・経済・法律
日時 2021年10月15日(金) 13時30分から15時00分
会場 オンライン開催
申し込み窓口 東京大学社会科学研究所 担当:三上様

問い合わせ先 東京大学社会科学研究所 担当:三上様(03-5841-4936)

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations, OEIO, meets every month to exchange research ideas on institutional and organizational economics.  Participants include both people specialized in theoretical research and those in empirical research.  Topics of meetings might be about microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, or economic history..., whatever on institutional and organizational economics.

Date :   Friday, October 15, 2021 13:30 to 15:00 Place Will be held online

Presenter Junichiro Ishida, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Title Signaling under double-crossing preferences

Abstract
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types.  There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold.  Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi-concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction.第139回「制度と組織の経済学pdf.jpg

ページトップへ